groups, and EO in particular, appears to be growing rapidly. Western European intelligence sources state that EO has 'unlimited potential for expansion and self-enrichment certainly within Africa and there is little evidence of the bandwagon slowing down',9 and predict that: Executive Outcomes will become ever richer and more potent, capable of exercising real power, even to the extent of keeping military regimes in being. If it continues to expand at the present rate, its influence in sub-Saharan Africa could become crucial.10
WHO IS EXECUTIVE OUTCOMES?
Most of EO's soldiers have come from South Africa's former 32 Battalion, the Reconnaissance Commandos, the Parachute Brigade and the paramilitary 'Koevoet' or 'Crowbar'. These four groups were South Africa's spearhead for military destabilisation throughout southern Africa during the I98os. The SADF's Special Forces and the 32 Battalion saw especially heavy service in Angola, where they gained a thorough knowledge of UNITA's guerrilla capabilities and of the Angolan terrain, and several times plucked UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi, from the jaws of defeat. The 32 Battalion, composed largely of Portuguese-speaking Angolans, became South Africa's most highly decorated unit since the Second World War. Blacks reportedly comprise about 70 per cent of EO, but most of these serve as combat soldiers.
Three of EO's leaders reflect this elite unit background. Eeben Barlow, EO's chairman until mid-I997, had been second-in-command of the 32 Battalion's reconnaissance unit, and was later a top official of the Civil Cooperation Bureau, which was particularly notorious for fomenting conflict inside South Africa. Laffras Luitingh, head of recruitment, had been a major in 5 Reconnaissance Commando. Nic van den Bergh, chief executive officer, had been a lieutenant-colonel in the Parabats, and took over the chairmanship after Barlow and Luitingh resigned from EO in July I997. EO is a military anomaly: a feared force that has neither a standing army nor a major weapons stockpile.11 The company picks its employees from a list of 2,000 proven and trusted combat specialists. Eeben Barlow notes that 'we've had an awful lot of calls and letters 9 Information gathered by author, July i996. 0 Pech and Beresford, 'Corporate dogs'. " The absence of a standing force and supply stockpile has at least two advantages: the host country (South Africa) does not feel a physical threat and EO can reduce its administrative costs. Limited medical aid for civilians augmented intelligence from signals intercepts, ground and air reconnaissance and host governments.
EO did not mount any major civic action programmes but its ability to defeat rebel groups militarily, and its correct behaviour towards the general population, created popularity with civilians -although, as a World Bank critic of EO rejoins, ' It doesn't take much [in Angola or Sierra Leone] to look pretty good. ' militaries later backfired in Sierra Leone, and was a contributory factor to the subsequent army/RUF takeover.
LOYALTY TO THE STATE
The generally-used definition of 'mercenary', a foreign soldier fighting for money, suggests a purchasable and changeable loyalty. It might well be asked whether a government could trust Executive Outcomes, given the company's profit-driven ethos and its opposition to UNITA, which EO personnel had previously supported when fighting for the SADF. In practice none the less, and in return for significant payments, EO has remained loyal to its employers.3" It has not switched sides, has not threatened the government, and has not shirked from combat -three traits of many past mercenary operations. national militaries in Angola, Sierra Leone and Papua New Guinea. In Angola, EO faced a special problem; cooperating with a former enemy. 'The FAA had a lot of hostility towards us', recalls Barlow. 'They couldn't forget very quickly a lot of past engagements.'46 Luitingh remembers that the MPLA was 'hesitant to divulge force levels and deployment which we needed for our operational planning'. 4 EO's quick successes, notably at N'dalatando, lessened FAA hostility.
However, mutual suspicions sometimes remained. EO operated outside the normal chain of command in Sierra Leone, where it reported directly to the president, who was also minister of defence, and to the deputy minister of defence. It continued to keep much of its operational intelligence to itself, since the allegiance of much of the RSLMF was questionable. EO's Operations Room at Defence Headquarters was off-limits to almost all of Sierra Leone's officers. then, in mid-March, openly broke with his government. Singirok demanded that Chan quit over his hiring of EO. Chan then sacked Singirok, an action which helped trigger large anti-EO street demonstrations. Sandline and EO ignominiously left the country and a beleaguered Chan stepped down. Although Singirok justified his actions by claiming that EO planned to use force directly against Bougainvillians, notably with helicopter-fired rockets, other observers claim that the motivating factor was army resentment over EO's capabilities and its high pay: 'the Sandline contract undermined [Singirok's] standing with his own troops who, frustrated by low pay and poor equipment, were infuriated by the money paid to the mercenaries 50 Another worry is that Executive Outcomes' training and combat skills may only increase the militarisation and destabilization of a desperately poor continent. Endangered governments could turn to EO, rather than to peaceful negotiations, to answer insurgents' demands. The UK Parliamentary Human Rights Group has suggested that EO's Sierra Leonean success 'may lead to a situation where any government in a difficult position can hire mercenaries to stay in power',51 while a company that depends upon strife for its profit may understandably work to start or prolong conflict.52 Others worry that the training and equipping of irregular forces, such as the Kamajors, will threaten future stability, since such groups are less controllable than regular militaries. Finally, EO has inspired, or assisted, a number of corporate security companies in Sierra Leone, Angola and elsewhere within Africa. Such groups, encouraged both by foreign companies and by national governments, may become a force unto themselves.53 Given EO's short history, these worries cannot yet be adequately answered. Any foreign intervention, however, no matter how well 50 'Mercenaries' chief held on arms charge', Observer (London), 23 March I997. Sandline officials believe that General Singirok deliberately okayed EO's mission in order to use the mercenaries' presence against Prime Minister Chan. intentioned, may destabilise an already fragile situation. West Africa offers an interesting comparison between the effects of regional militaries and private forces on militarization. ECOMOG, a multinational African peacekeeping force, tried for six years to end a devastating civil war in Liberia, but did not achieve peace during its first six years there. In fact, several national contingents within ECOMOG prolonged the Liberian conflict by arming and abetting one or other of the factions, which subsequently turned against their regional benefactor and prolonged the war.54 While there are important differences between the two wars,55 EO helped to end Sierra Leone's insurgency during its year and a half stay, even though political instability resumed after its departure. much of this is inoperable, due to inadequate maintenance.57 The lack of democracy and 'transparency' has weakened military efficiency.
EO's victories produced different reactions from the two militaries. EO's successes in
The changing nature of African conflict sometimes provides new benefits to insurgencies. Rebel groups can increasingly avail themselves of ideal guerrilla equipment -cheap, lightweight and reliable weaponry -much of which is surplus material from the Cold War. Insurgents have developed external economic ties (and resultant foreign exchange) to finance their warfare.58 They often recruit 'child soldiers', and have forced economic concessions from well-meaning but defenseless relief groups.
Major political changes have permitted a partial acceptance of EO. By I993, apartheid was dead, and now-private EO personnel were not noticeably furthering a reprehensible ideology. The ending of the Cold War lessened great power support for often corrupt regimes, and thus endangered the state's patronage power. At the same time, rag-tag insurgencies and 'warlords' were employing sometimes grisly violence to threaten increasingly fragile regimes. Somalia and Liberia provided visual cautionary tales of the need for adequate state security. Also aiding EO's acceptability was the fact that desperate sovereign governments, such as Angola's MPLA, were seeking EO's assistance. Because EO aided sovereign states, neither of the major regional powers, South Africa and Nigeria, nor the OAU, campaigned strongly against EO.60 EO's stabilizing actions contrasted with those of its opponents. UNITA and the RUF enjoyed only limited domestic and international support. Savimbi's refusal to accept the I992 election results and his subsequent return to warfare greatly reduced his already limited credibility. The RUF was readily perceived as a proxy for the Liberian warlord, Charles Taylor. The threat from the insurgents thus proved more worrisome than the background of EO. UNITA held about 85 per cent of Angola in late I992, about i,ooo people daily were dying from the war, and a potentially booming economy was in ashes. Both guerrilla and government forces had engaged in human rights The 'white knight' status conferred upon EO by several writers is misleading. Indigenous groups, notably the FAA in Angola and the Kamajors in Sierra Leone, provided indispensable backing by supplying intelligence and large numbers of men for combat and garrisoning. While military analysts agree that EO hastened the wars' endings, they disagree as to whether EO turned the tide or simply hastened an inevitable conclusion. Executive Outcomes itself will limit its operations, trying not to overextend its resources or enter politically Executive Outcomes will also limit its involvements if it maintains its policy of assisting governments, and not insurgencies, while its lack of French speakers (probably one of several factors which kept it from assisting Mobutu) will probably eliminate any large-scale involvement in Francophone Africa. Sierra Leone's $I 9-5 million arrears and Papua New Guinea's domestic political divisions may add further caution to EO's decisions. It also faces an ageing and finite manpower pool of South African-trained and tested combat personnel. Part of EO's unique ability stemmed from a force with common training, outlook and combat experience. Yet the former SADF had de-emphasised combat capability and had stopped its regional destabilisation by I 990. Barlow acknowledges that this problem will increasingly trouble EO.77 EO's combat success may not spawn many imitators. Its composition, of proven veterans with shared training and experience, and its permanent structure, have proved unique. Ad hoc multinational mercenary groups may draw inspiration from EO, but like the recent 400-man force in Zaire, will achieve only mediocre results.
A British intelligence assessment that EO will enjoy 'unlimited potential for expansion within Africa '78 is wrong. The organisation faces an uncertain future. It may not gain many more large combat contracts, for already specified reasons. Yet serious post-Cold War instability will continue in many African countries, African militaries will often prove ineffective, and so the need will continue for private security.
7 Barlow, interview. EO can draw soldiers from other countries, but this would probably lower its combat capabilities. EO's refusal to permanently employ its soldiers means that if EO does not land frequent contracts, its soldiers may seek more permanent employment and decline subsequent EO possibilities. The burgeoning growth of corporate security companies, with their more permanent work possibilities, may further drain EO of its experienced soldiers.
8 Information gathered by author, July I996.
